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TAKING PRECEDENTS IN THE TIDELANDS:
REFOCUSING ON EMINENT DOMAIN
W. Wade Berryhill*
Susan S. Williams**
I. INTRODUCTION
"Buy land, they're not making any more," Will Rogers suppos-
edly once recommended.' If he did, then Will had never taken a
good look at the shore: Over the years, millions of acres of tide-
lands have been dredged and filled, many to provide new recrea-
tional facilities and vacation homesites.2
That the coastal zone is both an immensely valuable and an
alarmingly fragile aggregation of sand and salt water is so widely
recognized3 that the statement itself is a truism rapidly approach-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., Arkansas
State University, 1967; J.D., University of Arkansas, 1972; L.L.M., Columbia University,
1976.
** B.A., University of North Carolina-Greensboro, 1968; J.D., T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond, 1984; Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen,
Richmond, Va.
1. J. KUSLER, REGULATING SENSITIVE LANDS vii (1980).
2. "Since 1850 Florida has lost about 60 percent of its wetlands, according to Florida
Department of Environmental Regulation Secretary Victoria J. Tschinkel." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 25, 1983, § E, at 20, col. 1. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that, of the
original 127,000,000 acres of wetlands in the 48 contiguous states, 45,000,000 acres had dis-
appeared by 1956. ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WETLAND MANAGEMENT, 97th CONG., 2D
SEss., A REPORT FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 65 (Comm.
Print 1982).
3. See, e.g., the congressional findings which introduce the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972 (CZMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982):
(b) The coastal zone is rich in a variety of natural, commercial, recreational, ecolog-
ical, industrial, and esthetic resources of immediate and potential value to the pre-
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ing terminal cliche status. However, recognition of the issue has
not led to widely accepted solutions. Attempts to address the prob-
lem have often been sidetracked by collateral issues, subordinated
to economic considerations, or simply lost in the triple labyrinth of
federal, state, and local bureaucracy.
Thus, state and local governments argue among themselves as to
which entity should have jurisdiction over the development deci-
sion 4 but join forces to decry federal interference. 5 The net effect is
interminable delay in doing anything at all.
The federal government is often no more consistent. On the one
hand, it spends huge sums to encourage state and regional coastal
planning and preservation. Simultaneously, the United States
Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection
Agency permit dumping of dredged spoils in ocean areas adjacent
to fishing sites, unless local officials act to block the disposal.'
Meanwhile, although some developments are derailed by the
sent and future well-being of the Nation.
(d) The coastal zone, and the fish, shellfish, other living marine resources, and wild-
life therein, are ecologically fragile and consequently extremely vulnerable to destruc-
tion by man's alterations ....
16 U.S.C. § 1451. See also Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural and Economic Re-
sources, 295 N.C. 683, -, 249 S.E.2d 402, 408 (1978) ("the unique, fragile and irreplaceable
nature of the coastal zone .... "); Brewer, The Concept of State and Local Relations
under the CZMA, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 717, 719 (1975) ("The area involved, the land-sea
interface, has a significance beyond its actual size as a result of the disproportionate popula-
tion growth in the area, the conflict of uses in the vertical and horizontal planes, and the
delicate nature of the prevailing ecosystems.").
4. Illustrative of the conflict between state and local government is the continuing debate
over which entity should regulate development in the Florida Keys. See, e.g., North Key
Largo, The Last Stand, Miami Herald Reprint passim, Sept., 1982 [hereinafter cited as
Reprint]. The Keys were designated an area of critical state concern in 1975. Id. at 2. The
designation was removed for Key West in 1981 but reinstated early in 1984. Miami Herald,
Mar. 4, 1984, at 1B, col. 5. Other areas of controversy have included delays in implementing
a county plan and, more recently, hearings on whether to designate the entire area as a state
aquatic preserve, see id., Feb. 5, 1984, at 1B, col. 1; id., Apr. 11, 1984, at ID, col. 1, and
whether the state should remove a moratorium imposed in 1983 on leasing of state-owned
bay bottoms for marina construction, see id., Apr. 20, 1984, at 1C, col. 4.
5. See J. KUSLER, supra note 1, at 64. Although in fiscal year 1981, the federal govern-
ment granted $35,534,000 to states for implementation of coastal management programs
under the CZMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982), neither Georgia nor Virginia has yet en-
acted programs meeting the CZMA's standards for approval. OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MAN-
AGEMENT, NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BIENNIAL REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT 51 (1982). See also M. AMERMAN, COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT IN VIRGINIA (1979).
6. See CZMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1456c, 1461 (1982).
7. Dumping of Silt Due to Resume, Miami Herald, Feb. 21, 1984, at 7A, col. 3.
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complicated permit procedure," permits are eventually granted for
other projects, including some of great magnitude, 9 perhaps be-
cause their developers have the financial resources to survive the
protracted administrative and judicial processes. 10
Part of the inconsistency may arise from the effort to graft tradi-
tional land-use controls onto an area in which the conflict among
the competing interests, economic and environmental, is thrown
into high relief.11 In economic terms, the issue is whether efficiency
8. See infra note 28 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 58-59.
9. See, e.g., this recent account:
Eleven years ago the [Florida] Legislature enacted a host of environmental measures
that were supposed to head off chaos as Florida grows ....
... No other state has done as much to save itself, so there are no answers to be
found elsewhere. In fact, other states are looking to Florida.
But the insufficiency of Florida's environmental legislation is evident:
The state's 12 million acres of life-supporting wetlands continue to disappear at the
rate of about 70,000 acres a year.
Greene, Florida's Environmental Laws Aren't Doing the Job, Miami Herald, Jan. 15, 1984,
at 6E, col. 1. "[Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Secretary] Tschinkel said
she 'should be ashamed to admit it' but her agency has permitted the permanent destruc-
tion of 7,500 acres of wetlands and the temporary disturbance of 3,000 acres during the past
two years." Miami Herald, Feb. 21, 1984, at 7A, col. 1.
10. See, e.g., Reprint, supra note 4.
11. This newspaper account reflects the environmentalist viewpoint:
Many of the people who fought to get the present environmental laws passed are now
ready to try something else-but with less optimism.
"For some reason, nothing works, and that is kind of depressing," said Richard
Pettigrew, former [Florida] state Senate leader from Miami who helped pass those
laws.
"What's the reason nothing works?". .. "Is it the absence of local will? Economic
pressure for growth that overrides all else? Strong speculative money going into cam-
paigns?" Pettigrew said he doesn't have the answer.
Neither do many other Florida leaders.
"There is great confusion in the system," [says George Meier, staff director for the
House Select Committee on Growth Management.] . . . "No one seems in control."
. . . "[T]he problems have gone beyond traditional government structures."
Greene, supra note 9, at col. 3. On the other hand, this anti-environmentalist (and pro-free
enterprise) criticism was leveled against the 1975 California Coastal Plan:
The Coastal Plan authors' contempt for private action is consistent with the myth
that "private planning is short-term and selfish while government planning is long-
term and public." This is the greatest myth of them all .... I submit that ...
public planning is guided by political motives and hence tends to be short-term in
nature ....
Even a casual glance at the affairs of most men indicates that private decisions are
not short-term.
Johnson, On the Economics of Environmental Extremism, in THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL
PLAN: A CRITIQUE 19-20 (1976).
[In economic analysis] the term "lexical ordering" [is used] to describe the single-
minded, uncompromising pursuit of a particular objective by a decision maker....
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or equity should dictate the allocation of coastal resources."2 After
years of separate and piecemeal regulation of land, water, and
sky,13 what has been, perhaps too sanguinely, described as a "quiet
revolution" in resource allocation has occurred, 4 and with it has
come the "comprehensive plan."' 5 Yet, despite skepticism of the
Consequently, it is fascinating to see the authors of the [California] Coastal Plan
exhibit their lexical preferences for environmental enhancement....
... Interpreted literally, the adverse environmental impact of activity in the
coastal zone would be minimized if ... all human activity were excluded from the
coastal zone. No doubt the authors of the Plan would plead that was not their inten-
tion; yet that is what they propose by their statements and by their advocacy of an
uncompromising and single-minded devotion to a single concern-the environment.
Id. at 9-10.
It is commonly alleged that "future generations are best served if the present gen-
eration conserves resources." This popular myth ignores the fact that future genera-
tions will receive a legacy from the present whatever happens; the only question. ..
is the form in which we pass the resources on to future generations. We can leave our
coal and iron ore in the ground so that future generations can use them as they please
or we can mine the coal and the ore, turn it into steel, machine it into capital goods,
and leave a legacy of capital and embodied technology.
Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
The fundamental question is: How will the citizens of California be able to register
their preferences for marshes versus housing, jobs versus wilderness areas, and gaso-
line versus marine life, if the [California] Coastal Plan is implemented? The Plan is
remarkably silent on the issue of how society's valuation of coastal resources versus
other goods and services will be discovered, if at all.
Id. at 10. "In the final analysis, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Coastal Resources
Allocation Plan has earned its acronym." Id. at 23.
For a more positive view of the California Plan, see PROTECTING THE GOLDEN SHORE: Las-
SONS FROM THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION (R. Healy ed. 1978).
12. "Efficiency" refers to "the relationship between the aggregate benefits of a situation
and the aggregate costs of the situation," while the term "equity" refers "to the distribution
of [the resources] . . . among individuals." A. POLINsKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECO-
NoMics 7 (1983).
In other words, efficiency corresponds to the "size of the pie," while equity has to do
with how it is sliced. Economists traditionally concentrate on how to maximize the
size of the pie, leaving to others-such as legislators-the decision how to divide
it . . ..
One important question is whether there is a conflict between the pursuit of effi-
ciency and the pursuit of equity. If the pie can be sliced in any way desired, then
clearly there is no conflict-with a bigger pie, everyone can get a bigger piece. If,
however, in order to create a bigger pie, its division must be quite unequal, .. there
may well be a conflict between efficiency and equity.
Id. at 7-8.
13. See R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 1-3 (1983).
14. See J. KUSLER, supra note 1, at 8.
15. The CZMA declares it to be a Congressional policy
to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the
coastal zone through the development and implementation of management programs
to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone, giving full
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economic determinism which has traditionally informed land-use
planning,1" and despite the general recognition that government at
some level must decide the distribution of scarce resources, 7 the
ambitious plans and programs of the last decade"8 have not worked
as expected: Citizens are angry, local governments are frustrated, 9
consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to needs
for economic development ....
16 U.S.C. § 1452(2) (1982).
16. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Hardin's brief article
has had great impact on environmental theory. It is perhaps most famous for the parable
from which the article takes its name:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It
is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on
the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries
because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast
well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reck-
oning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality.
At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implic-
itly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more
animal to my herd?"
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes
that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.
And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is
limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a
commons brings ruin to all.
Id. at 1244 (emphasis in original).
17. See A. POLINSKY, supra note 12, at 9-10.
18. E.g., CZMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 [hereinafter cited as Clean Water Act], 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
19. See Greene, supra note 9.
One of the areas designated critical was the Florida Keys. Environmentalists find it
hard to mention this without a bitter smirk. The designation was made way back in
the days when Port Bougainville was beginning to germinate in the brains of its de-
velopers. Today, with the Keys still under critical designation, the 2,800-unit North
Key Largo condo project is displacing fragile mangrove wetlands and tropical hard-
wood forests and threatening one of the world's most spectacular living coral reefs.
The monster project is a good example of how the goals and laws of 1972 need to be
reevaluated in 1984.
Id. at col. 4.
The state's designation of the Keys as an Area of Critical State Concern (ACSC)
has been meaningless in controlling growth and monitoring new developments.
Zoning records show that ... [from the date of designation in 1975 until 1982] at
least 51 major developments have been approved for construction-more than at any
other time in Monroe County history.
Reprint, supra note 4, at 2. "[Through July, 1982] the zoning board has never rejected a big
condominium project in the Keys." Id. at 4.
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and meanwhile the plowing under of tidelands continues."0
As demands on the shoreline grow and competition for each
piece of it intensifies, government'will be called upon with increas-
ing frequency to decide resource-use conflicts in ways which must
address both short-term economic concerns and long-term policy.
Local governing bodies may be incapable of resolving these con-
flicts satisfactorily, either because of their inability to control (as
well as limited interest in) activities beyond their boundaries or
because of limitations on their power imposed by the state.2 1 These
shortcomings of local control have led to an emphasis on state or
regional planning for the coastal zone.22 The planning itself can
generally be characterized as a choice between control by regula-
tion (the more common approach) and control through some sort
20. But vast stretches of the wild coastline had disappeared under assault of bulldozers
and dragline to make boatarama cities and mobile home retirement villages ....
Palls of smoke hid thousands of acres around industrial sites. Perhaps from the air
the destruction of what seemed to be left was invisible and the region was already
destroyed.
The question was:
Is there enough natural beauty left around the Gulf of Mexico to make it worth fight-
ing to save?
B. KEATING, THE GULF OF MEXICO 12-13 (1972). See also Mitchell, Alabama Coast Struggle:
Dunes vs. Developers, Miami Herald, Mar. 18, 1984, at 5B, col. 1 (detailing a boom in con-
dominium construction on the Alabama coast and stating that, along 40 miles of coast, 80
such projects have been started since 1979, despite severe sewage problems and the neces-
sity of sinking pilings 60 feet deep in order to anchor the condominiums during hurricanes).
21. Many states adhere to Dillon's Rule, which limits the power of municipalities:
The powers of corporations, stated in general language, are such and such only as the
legislature has conferred upon them. Those of municipal corporations . . . are:
1. Those granted in express words.
2. Those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted.
3. Those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not sim-
ply convenient, but indispensable.
C. ELLIOTT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS § 25 (J. Macy ed. 1910).
See also, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-838 to -839 (Repl. Vol. 1981) (codifying Dillon's Rule).
22. See, e.g., CZMA, 16 U.S.C. § 1451(i) (1982) ("The key to more effective protection
and use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone is to encourage the states to
exercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal zone. . . ."); California
Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000 to 30900 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp.
1984); Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
380.012 to 380.12 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984); Florida Coastal Management Act of
1978, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.19 to 380.25 (West Cum. Supp. 1984); New York Tidal Wet-
lands Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 25-0101 to -0601 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1984);
see also Miami Herald, Mar. 4, 1984, at 1B, col. 5 (quoting Florida Gov. Bob Graham as
saying that the designation of Key West as an area of critical state concern "'implies that
there are certain assets, qualities of a city or county that have a value that is more than
local in nature,' .. ").
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of ownership interest.
Control by regulation includes such techniques as traditional
land-use planning (i.e., the designation of certain areas for certain
general uses or activities) 23 and various permit systems requiring
governmental approval before certain property can be developed 24
or certain activities undertaken.2 5 Although too stringent regula-
tion runs the risk of being labeled an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation,26 the successful prose-
cution of such a "taking" 27 case under a state coastal act appears
to be the exception rather than the rule.2
Where feasible, regulation is clearly the more expedient and less
expensive method of control. However, in some circumstances, reg-
ulation is simply insufficient. The control needed to accomplish the
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (designating "areas of
critical concern").
24. See, e.g., CAL. Pus. RES. CODE §§ 30250 to 30255 (West 1977 & Cur. Supp. 1984)
(restrictions on coastal development); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West Cum. Supp. 1984)
(restrictions on "developments of regional impact").
25. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982) (establishing Army Corps of
Engineers permits for dredge and fill activities in navigable waters).
26. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state statute designed to
protect property above coal mines from subsidence held to have "taken" mining rights).
27. For the nuances of various "constructive" condemnation actions, see Mopping v. City
of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 46, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1972) (defining "de
facto taking" as a case in which "the landowner claims that because of particularly oppres-
sive acts by the public authority the 'taking' actually has occurred earlier than the date [of
the condemnation action] ... ."); D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAw §§ 180, 181 (1975) (distinguishing a regulatory "taking," such as that in
Pennsylvania Coal, from "inverse condemnation," in which government action negligently
damages private property). It appears, however, that many courts are unconcerned with the
niceties of these distinctions. For purposes of this article, the term "taking" will encompass
all such takings.
28. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 800-01, 553 P.2d 546, 556, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 396 (1976) (requirement of development
permit under California Coastal Act of 1972 held not to amount to a taking); Marina Plaza
v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 73 Cal. App. 3d 311, 325, 140 Cal. Rptr.
725, 733 (1977) (permit denial held not to invade or appropriate property right as required
for inverse condemnation); In re Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 176 N.J. Super. 69, 422 A.2d 107
(1980) (denial of dredge and fill permits held not to be a taking); Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (restrictions on filling wetlands held to be a proper
exercise of police power rather than an unconstitutional taking); see also Owens, Land Ac-
quisition and Coastal Resource Management: A Pragmatic Perspective, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 625, 632-33 & n. 33 (1983) (stating that successful taking challenges are rare). But see
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (injunction against filling wetland found to
be a deprivation of reasonable use of property and therefore a taking); Morris County Land
Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963)
(denial of request for variance from ordinance strictly limiting wetland uses held to be
confiscatory).
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state's purpose may be so extensive that it is inconsistent with pri-
vate ownership. For example, the state may wish to erect wind-
breaks on the property in order to protect the rest of the commu-
nity from storm damage,19 or to prohibit any private use of the
land in order to create a wildlife sanctuary. In such cases, regula-
tion may be inappropriate,"0 and the state must consider acquisi-
tion of either a fee or some other interest in the property."'
Alternatively, the regulatory scheme may have failed. Where the
tideland in question is extremely vulnerable or where conflicts
among resource users have become too complex or too fragmented
to be resolved by regulation, land acquisition can be not only a
tremendously valuable tool, but perhaps the only effective resource
management device available.
The focus of this article is on the state's power of eminent do-
main as a means of controlling the use of scarce coastal resources.
However, in order to determine whether this rather drastic exercise
of governmental power is the most appropriate means of effecting
its purposes, the state or its delegate must consider the alterna-
tives. This article therefore will first examine briefly other possible
means of control; it will then discuss the substantive and proce-
dural requirements of eminent domain; and finally, it will consider
problems of post-acquisition resource management.3 2
II. ALTERNATIVES TO CONDEMNATION
Prior to commencing a condemnation action, the state (or re-
gional planning body) ought to consider whether the forced
purchase of a property interest is the only method of achieving its
29. This example is borrowed from Owens, supra note 28, at 631 (citing Lorio v. City of
Sea Isle City, 88 N.J. Super. 506, 212 A.2d 802 (1965)).
30. "To leave . . . [the landowners] with commercially valueless land in upholding the
restriction [on wetland development] presently imposed, is to charge them with more than
their just share of the cost of this state-wide conservation program .... State v. Johnson,
265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
31. As a prerequisite to receiving "administrative grants" under the CZMA, a state must
demonstrate that it has authority "to acquire fee simple and less than fee simple interests in
lands, waters, and other property through condemnation or other means when necessary to
achieve conformance with the management program." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(2) (1982).
32. Although certain problems, such as those presented by dealing with an unwilling
seller, are unique to the situation of a forced sale, other considerations addressed infra may
also be present in negotiated purchases. For example, considerations of management costs
and policy should not vary substantially with the method of acquisition. Therefore, what is
said about those problems in the context of eminent domain may be equally applicable to
other situations.
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objectives. The very nature of a condemnation action presupposes
an adversarial proceeding, careful attention to due process consid-
erations, and substantial investments of time and public money in
litigating the case. Furthermore, eminent domain is a politically
unpopular power, evoking fears of "Big Brother" totalitarianism
and generating sympathy for the landowner, one of whose most
sacrosanct rights, that of private property, is threatened.33 Nearly
every other form of control, including negotiated purchase, in-
volves less time and trouble, and most involve less expense as well.
A. Land Use Regulations
So long as the desired controls are not so stringent as to give rise
to a "taking" claim,34 administrative regulation is a very desirable
means of effectuating coastal land-use policy. It is relatively inex-
pensive, 35 can usually take effect within a short time,36 frees the
state from the complications of land management, and is accorded
considerable judicial deference if challenged.
If the action can be characterized as "legislative" (i.e., a regula-
tion of general application 37), it will be upheld in court unless it
can be shown to be "arbitrary and capricious. s3 Even if the action
makes an individual adjudication, such as the denial of a permit,
and is therefore judicial or quasi-judicial, it will be sustained so
long as it bears a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, or
33. See Owens, supra note 28, at 630, 635.
34. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co.
v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
35. See Note, Updating Eminent Domain for Environmental Control, 4 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 24, 32 (1976). Administrative and personnel costs are involved, of course, but these
costs also occur in land acquisition situations.
36. However, promulgation of, and amendments to, regulations frequently require a no-
tice period and opportunity for public comment before the regulations take effect. See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:8 (Repl. Vol. 1978) (provision for hearings on regulations promul-
gated under the Virginia Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14:20
(Repl. Vol. 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1983)); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-431 (Cum. Supp. 1983) (adver-
tisement of local zoning plans, ordinances, and amendments).
37. Zoning classifications, although applied to individual parcels of land, are often consid-
ered legislative actions. See R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE
738-42 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing cases from various jurisdictions, some of which characterize
zoning as legislative and some as quasi-judicial).
38. See Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, -, 215 N.W.2d 179, 188 (1974)
(zoning case in which plaintiffs' argument that another use would make the land more valu-
able did not "meet the burden plaintiffs have in showing that exclusion of other uses from
this property was arbitrary and capricious."). See generally Davis v. California Coastal Zone
Conservation Comm'n, 57 Cal. App. 3d 700, 705-07, 129 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420-21 (1976).
1984] 461
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welfare, and there is "substantial evidence" to support the action. 9
Only when a fundamental right, such as a vested property interest,
is affected by the regulatory action will the court apply stricter
scrutiny to the government's action.40 (Note, however, that the
landowner has no property interest in the existing or proposed
zoning of his land.41 By analogy, neither should he have any such
interest in a designation of his property under a coastal plan ab-
sent a denial by the state of a particular use for the property.)
Once a property interest42 is found to be affected by the regula-
tory action, a court may choose to employ any of several tests for
determining whether the action constitutes a compensable tak-
ing.43 One test which has been applied in wetlands litigation is
whether the regulation deprives the landowner of the use44 of his
property. This was one of the criteria used in Morris County Land
Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills,45 a case
in which the court found a regulation depriving the landowner of
income-producing uses of his property to amount to a taking. A
similar result under similar reasoning was obtained in State v.
Johnson.46 In both cases, the courts focused on the fact that un-
filled marshland had no commercial use. Other courts, however,
have rejected the taking challenge under substantially similar cir-
39. See Coastal Southwest Dev. Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n,
55 Cal. App. 3d 525, 540, 127 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (1976).
40. See Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App. 3d
149, 154, 129 Cal. Rptr. 743, 746 (1976); Transcentury Properties, Inc. v. State, 41 Cal. App.
3d 835, 844-45, 116 Cal. Rptr. 487, 492 (1974).
41. See Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d
785, 796, 553 P.2d 546, 553, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 393 (1976).
42. See W. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DoMAIN 1-3 (1977) (discuss-
ing the types of interest that have been considered "property" for condemnation purposes);
see also D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 180.
43. See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, §§ 179-181. It is clearly beyond the scope of
this article to examine all the permutations of the "taking" issue.
44. Some courts find a taking when the owner is deprived of any "reasonable" use. See
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970). However, what is a "reasonable" use seems
to depend on the predilections of the court. Compare Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d
7, -, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (wetland regulations limiting landowners to "natural and
indigenous uses" held reasonable) with Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township
of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, __, 193 A.2d 232, 240 (1963) (wetland regulations
keeping swamp in its natural state held to deprive owner of uses "of the type available...
as a reasonable means of obtaining a return from his property" and therefore a taking).
45. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
46. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). For a suggestion that the state's attorney mishandled the
case, see Halperin, Conservation, Policy, and the Role of Counsel, 23 ME. L. REV. 119
(1971).
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cumstances.47 Still other courts have focused on the burden on the
landowner to prove deprivation of use, generally concluding that
the owner has failed to show that there is no reasonable use re-
maining for his property.48 It has also been asserted that the owner
has a right to continue only a use "actually instituted . .. [but]
not to capitalize upon anticipated profit. ' 4 It appears that the
"deprivation of use" test is not so much an analytical tool as a
convenient formulation of the court's opinion and, as such, is not
particularly helpful in determining whether a taking has occurred.
A second, somewhat overlapping test employed in Parsippany
appears to offer a somewhat more objective basis of analysis, al-
though it too is far from free of ambiguity. This test, the public
benefit vs. prevention of public harm test,50 provides that if the
regulation creates a public benefit, it is a compensable taking;
whereas if it is intended to prevent a public harm, it is a valid
exercise of the police power.5' the notion that prevention of public
harm does not require compensation for taking or damage proba-
bly derives from the right of government to abate a public nui-
sance.52 However, the prevention of harm doctrine may also have
47. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
48. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887) (statute prohibiting manufacture and
sale of alcoholic beverages "does not disturb the [brewery] owner in the control or use of his
property for lawful purposes").
49. Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 58 Cal. App.
3d 833, 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1976) (upholding denial of permit to subdivide coastal
property pending formulation of a statewide coastal plan).
50. 40 N.J. at -, 193 A.2d at 240 ("[T]he main purpose of enacting regulations with the
practical effect of retaining the meadows in their natural state was for a public benefit [flood
control and open space].").
51. "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. at 668-69. See also D. Hagman, supra note 27, § 28.
52. Certainly the Court in Mugler seemed to think so:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their prop-
erty as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is
not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot
be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted,
by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. The exercise
of the police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance,
or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreci-
ated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person
of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only is abated;
in the other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner.
123 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
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evolved from the government's privilege to destroy private prop-
erty in an emergency, such as to prevent the spread of fire or to
keep the property from falling into enemy hands during wartime.53
Whatever its origins, the doctrine is susceptible to varying appli-
cations in the wetlands context. For example, in Parsippany, the
regulations prohibiting commercial uses of marshland were found
to create the public benefits of flood control and open space5 4 and
were therefore confiscatory. Similarly, in State v. Johnson,55 the
court found that wetland regulations were intended to preserve" 'a
valuable natural resource of the state,' ",56 adding, "the benefits
from its preservations. . . are state-wide. The cost of its preserva-
tion should be publicly borne. ' 57 However, a very similar regula-
tion was held in Just v. Marinette County55 to amount to preven-
tion of a public harm. In response to the landowners' argument
that their property had suffered severe depreciation in value, the
court held:
[T]his depreciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its
natural state but on what the land would be worth if it could be
filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While loss of value is
to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a construc-
tive taking, value based upon changing the character of the land at
the expense of harm to public rights is not an essential factor or
controlling.
• . . The shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, the envi-
ronment, and natural resources as they were created and to which
the people have a present right. The ordinance does not create or
improve the public condition but only preserves nature from the
despoilage and harm resulting from the unrestricted activities of
humans.59
53. See C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 39-41 (3d
ed. 1977) (discussing emergency cases). The authors state that "[a]lthough authority on the
question is scant, the general view is that the privilege [to destroy private property] is...
complete in that no action will lie against either the private or governmental parties whose
conduct is justified by a public necessity." Id. at 39.
54. 40 N.J. at __, 193 A.2d at 240.
55. 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
56. Id. at 716 (apparently quoting from an unreported earlier proceeding arising out of
the same permit denial).
57. Id.
58. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
59. Id. at -, 201 N.W.2d at 771 (footnote omitted).
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Are such concerns as flood control, clean water, and preservation of
fish and wildlife primarily benefits to the public, or are they in-
stead preventive measures to control floods, water pollution, and
the loss of valuable resources? These concerns seem susceptible to
either characterization.
Thus, it is apparent that, despite the advantages of control by
land-use regulation, this method has definite, if ill-defined limita-
tions even beyond the administrative difficulties.6 0 Particularly in
an unsympathetic jurisdiction, the application of the regulation
may be invalidated. The state then has the choice either of redraft-
ing the regulation in the hope that it will survive the court's scru-
tiny on the next challenge or of exercising its power of eminent
domain. Certain other methods of control are more severely lim-
ited in application but are less susceptible to characterization as a
compensable taking because private property interests are held to
be either restricted, overridden, or nonexistent.6 '
B. Public Trust
In brief, the public trust doctrine declares that the state holds
the navigable waters, submerged lands, and at least a part of the
tidelands62 as trustee for the public.6 3 Derived from a mixture of
60. See supra text accompanying notes 3-20.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (finding no
property interest in the water level of a stream); United States v. 62.61 Acres of Land, 547
F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a jetty extending into navigable waters is not a com-
pensable property interest); People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, -, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334,
346 (1960) (holding that an upland owner's right of access across tidelands was too specula-
tive an interest to be compensable in eminent domain proceedings).
62. Usually, the state holds land in public ownership to the mean high-water (or high
tide) mark. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
1.2 (Repl. Vol. 1982) (extending private ownership to the mean low-water mark). Public
rights to the dry-sand area (between the high-water mark and the vegetation line) have been
hotly litigated in some jurisdictions. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462
P.2d 671 (1969) (discussing public trust but basing the public's right on the separate doc-
trine of custom). New Jersey has very recently determined, under public trust, "that the
public must be given both such access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as is
reasonably necessary." Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, -, 471
A.2d 355, 365 (1984). See also Alter, The Erosion of Private Ownership of Shorefront Prop-
erty, REAL EsT. REV., Winter, 1983, at 45, 46. The article was written before the New Jersey
Supreme Court had heard the Matthews case, but the author pointed out that, if the claim
of public rights in the dry-sand area were recognized in this case, New Jersey would become
the first east-coast state to find such a right. Id. at 46.
New Jersey has frequently litigated the public trust doctrine in the context of beach use.
See, e.g., Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981)
(overturning zoning ordinance which restricted beachfront property to single-family residen-
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Roman law, English common law, 4 and a certain amount of politi-
cal expediency,65 the doctrine is invoked primarily in cases of a
conveyance of tidelands to private parties66 or of desired public ac-
cess to beaches.6
Under the public trust doctrine, the public is said to be entitled
to certain uses (the jus publicum) of the tidelands, traditionally
rights of navigation, trade, and fishing." While some courts still
adhere to these narrow eighteenth-century limitations on uses, 69
many other courts have adopted a more expansive view of the doc-
trine, holding that "[t]he public uses to which tidelands are subject
are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. '70
Probably, the most commonly asserted new public use is that of
recreation. 1
The public trust doctrine has certain distinct advantages for
coastal land-use planning. As a common law doctrine, it is proba-
bly more flexible than many statutory devices. Unlike other, simi-
lar common law doctrines such as custom 72 and prescription,7 con-
tial uses and limited recreation to an accessory use); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J.
174, -, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (1978) (holding that a publicly owned beach is subject to public
trust and "must be open to all on equal terms and without preference"); Borough of Nep-
tune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972) (municipality cannot charge
nonresidents higher rates than residents for use of municipally owned beach).
63. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 425 (1892) ("It is a title held in trust
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on com-
merce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interfer-
ence of private parties."); Borough of Neptune City, 61 N.J. at -, 294 A.2d at 51 ("[L]and
covered by tidal waters belonged to the sovereign, but for the common use of all the
people.").
64. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, 606 P.2d 362, 364-65, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, 329-30, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Bradford v. Nature Conservancy,
224 Va. 181, 194, 294 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1982).
65. See R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 80-81 (discussing evolution of the
public trust doctrine).
66. E.g., Bradford, 224 Va. at 181, 294 S.E.2d at 866.
67. E.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
68. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452.
69. Bradford, 224 Va. at 197, 294 S.E.2d at 874 (public has "right to fish, fowl and
hunt."). This case was decided under a statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 41.1-4 (Repl. Vol. 1981),
but the statute itself amounts to a codification of the early common law.
70. Marks, 6 Cal. 3d at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
71. See Van Ness, 78 N.J. at 174; 393 A.2d at 571 (municipality unable to limit public
right to beach recreation by restricting use to residents); Borough of Neptune City, 61 N.J.
at 296, 294 A.2d at 47 (municipality allowed to assess beach user fees but not to discrimi-
nate between residents and nonresidents).
72. See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
73. See Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970)
(granting injunction to protect prescriptive easement to beach from self-help by landown-
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tinual use over a period of years is not required in order to find a
public trust. Unlike implied dedication,7 the intent of the land-
owner, the public, and the state is irrelevant. The trust exists re-
gardless of how the parties behave.75
On the other hand, the doctrine has a number of drawbacks. It is
limited geographically to navigable waters and tidelands.76 Thus,
uplands (above the vegetation line77) are not subject to the trust.
Even more seriously, the uses for which the trust may be employed
are generally restricted to those involving some sort of public par-
ticipation. This limitation has a twofold effect: First, a littoral
owner may make any use he likes of his property so long as it does
not interfere with these specific public rights.78 Second, there is
serious doubt whether the landowner (state or individual) can put
the land to a use which is clearly beneficial to the public but which
excludes the public from the property.
For example, a recent Virginia case79 prohibited a private entity,
the Nature Conservancy, from excluding the public from barrier
island property which the Conservancy had acquired for the pur-
pose of preserving it in its natural state. Several New Jersey cases
have forbidden coastal municipalities to place restrictions on ac-
cess by nonresidents to their beaches.80
ers); Daley v. Town of Swampscott, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 959, 421 N.E.2d 78 (1981).
74. See Bradford, 224 Va. at 198, 294 S.E.2d at 875:
In order for a road to be dedicated to the public, there must be an offer made by the
landowner and an acceptance by the public .... While a dedication may be implied
from the acts of the owner, these acts must be unmistakable to show the intention of
the landowner to permanently give up his property.
The opinion goes on to say that, because of frequent permissive use in rural areas, "formal
acceptance by the public" or by the government on its behalf is required in such cases. Id.
at 198-99, 294 S.E.2d at 875.
75. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding that an attempted
conveyance to a private party by the state legislature could not defeat the trust). Occasion-
ally, where there has been considerable investment over a period of time in reliance on the
conveyance, the state has been estopped from asserting the doctrine. See City of Berkeley v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840
(1980).
76. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
77. See R. HILDRETH & R. JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 132 (quoting D. BROWER, ACCESS TO
THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 19-20 (1978)).
78. See Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974) (construction of
observation tower 17 feet in diameter and resting on sand held not to interfere with public's
recreational rights in beach).
79. Bradford v. Nature Conservancy, 224 Va. 181, 294 S.E.2d 866 (1982).
80. Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981); Van
Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978); Borough of Neptune City v.
Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
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California apparently takes a more liberal view of permissible
uses. In the context of a case dealing with the right to fish from
public lands"l (a right guaranteed by the state constitution82 ), the
state supreme court held that the right would not apply "to state-
owned lands which are used for a governmental purpose that is
incompatible with use by the public for fishing. ' s3 (However, the
examples cited of such inconsistent uses are prisons and mental
institutions.84 ) Another California case"5 specifically suggests in
dictum that the public trust might be expanded to include "preser-
vation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve
as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as envi-
ronments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life,
and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."8
In a jurisdiction whose philosophy more closely resembles that of
New Jersey than that of California, a state coastal agency wishing
to restrict public access for preservation purposes might still be
able to do so in one situation: If the agency acquires the tideland
through eminent domain and if the state is one which views a title
so acquired as an original title, 7 the agency can argue that it has
thus taken the property free of the public trust. The argument
would go roughly as follows: The public trust was an incident of
the former grant, which derived from the sovereign and, in effect,
separated title and beneficial ownership, just as in any other sort
of trust. When the state acquired the land by condemnation, the
old title and all its incidents were extinguished. Thus, although
the nature of eminent domain requires that the land be taken for a
public use,"s that use no longer must include public access and rec-
reational rights. (This argument presupposes a distinction between
81. State v. San Luis Obispo Sportsman's Ass'n, 22 Cal. 3d 440, 584 P.2d 1088, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 482 (1978).
82. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25.
83. 22 Cal. 3d at 447, 584 P.2d at 1091, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
84. Id.
85. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
86. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
87. See A.W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1925):
Ordinarily an unqualified taking in fee by eminent domain takes all interests and as
it takes the res is not called upon to specify the interests that happen to exist. ...
[T]he accurate view would seem to be that such an exercise of eminent domain
founds a new title and extinguishes all previous rights.
(emphasis added). But see 3 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.1 (rev.
3d ed. 1981) (stating that courts are split on the question of whether eminent domain con-
fers original title).
88. See infra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
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the state and the public, of course. If the two are considered iden-
tical, the state could never condemn the public's interest because it
would already own it. However, such a separation of interests is
implicit in any trust.)
Regardless of the merits of this argument, however, its applica-
bility is clearly limited, as indeed is the usefulness of the public
trust doctrine as a land-use tool.
C. Navigational Servitudes
A doctrine with many of the same philosophical underpinnings
as public trust is that of the navigational servitude. "Stated in its
broadest form, the navigation servitude stands as a bar to compen-
sation when riparian rights are destroyed by governmental activi-
ties done under aegis of a power to regulate or improve
navigation."89
This servitude, anchored in the commerce clause, 90 is a well-es-
tablished principle of federal law.91 While its precise parameters
may be disputed,92 it is clear that the doctrine gives the federal
government authority to take or damage certain riparian rights or
interests93 in navigable waters or even in nonnavigable waters flow-
ing into a navigable stream, 4 without compensation, so long as the
taking is at least partially in aid of navigation.9 5 However, compen-
sation is due "when permanent physical encroachment upon or in-
vasion of land riparian to the navigable waterway but above the
ordinary high-water mark results."98
89. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 42, at 99.
90. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
91. See, e.g., United States v. 62.61 Acres of Land, 547 F.2d 818, 820 (4th Cir. 1977)
(holding that condemnation of submerged land did not entitle riparian owner to compensa-
tion, either for land or for attached stone jetty).
92. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that the servitude did
not apply to a body of water which became navigable only after artificial improvements).
93. In some cases the court has denied even the existence of a property interest. See
United States v. 62.61 Acres of Land, 547 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a jetty
extending into the Chesapeake Bay was not only noncompensable but also merely permis-
sive, and therefore not a property interest).
94. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960) (federal hydroelec-
tric project in nonnavigable tributary of navigable river held to constitute part of plan for
flood control and regulation of navigation and therefore to fall within the servitude).
95. See Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (upholding application of servitude to
hydroelectric project with incidental benefit of flood control).
96. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, -, 432 P.2d 3, 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 409 (1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949 (1968).
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Although less well known,97 a state navigational servitude also
exists. It "is subordinate to the federal one, but where the federal
government has not acted, it allows the state, in aid of navigation,
to take private riparian rights without paying the compensation
that would otherwise be required by the fourteenth amendment."9 s
Its origins have been variously ascribed to the public trust doc-
trine99 and to the state's police power. 100
Perhaps because of the pervasiveness of federal authority over
navigation, the state servitude has seldom been employed.10 How-
ever, the 1967 California case of Colberg, Inc. v. State'02 not only
invoked the doctrine but apparently greatly expanded its scope. 0 3
In denying compensation to a shipyard owner whose access was
partially blocked by a freeway bridge over a navigable river, the
court declared that "[t]he state, as owner of its navigable water-
ways subject to a trust for the benefit of the people, may act rela-
tive to those waterways in any manner consistent with the im-
provement of commercial traffic and intercourse.' ' 104 Furthermore,
"[t]he servitude . ..precludes compensation for impairment or
curtailment of all rights not damaged by permanent physical inva-
sion of or encroachment upon fast lands. . . ."105 Thus, under this
broadened doctrine, a state action which aided land traffic and
commerce and, in fact, obstructed navigation was found to be
noncompensable.
Despite fears that Colberg might mean that "no owner on navi-
gable waters .. .will ever again receive compensation from the
state for the taking of his riparian rights,"'1 6 the case has seldom
been cited and has apparently never been determinative in a
water-rights controversy. 07  In an Alaska case, Wernberg v.
97. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 42, at 113.
98. Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Alaska 1973).
99. Colberg, 67 Cal. 2d at -, 432 P.2d at 8-9, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
100. Wernberg, 516 P.2d at 1195.
101. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 42, at 114 & n.129 (indicating that the doctrine ap-
pears primarily in dicta); see also Wernberg, 516 P.2d 1191, in which the doctrine was raised
in argument but held not to apply.
102. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 949
(1968).
103. See W. STOEBUCK, supra note 42, at 115-16 ("If the doctrine of this decision should
catch on, the case would become famous, for the doctrine is as original as it is far reaching."
Id. at 115).
104. 67 Cal. 2d at -, 432 P.2d at 11, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at -, 432 P.2d at 14, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
106. W. STOEBUCK, supra note 42, at 116.
107. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 545, 606 P.2d 362, 380,
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State,"0 8 a Colberg argument was expressly rejected. The well-rea-
soned opinion, which analyzed the historical and philosophical ba-
ses of the state servitude, identified as "the greatest flaw in the
Colberg reasoning .. .that it finds a state servitude broader in
scope than the federal servitude to which it is admittedly
subordinate.' 109
Although a Colberg-type servitude would undoubtedly be of
great benefit to a state wishing to assert control over tidelands,
principles of fairness suggest that the doctrine not be invoked. The
navigational servitude is, after all, a species of noncompensable
condemnation and, as such, should be both narrowly construed
and sparingly applied.
D. Voluntary Acquisitions
Having decided that neither land-use regulation nor any sort of
noncompensable public easement will serve its purposes, the state
should consider acquiring an ownership interest in the wetlands.
One commentator has identified three general methods of acquisi-
tion: purchase (including eminent domain), donation, and
dedication.1 0
A voluntary, negotiated purchase may occasionally give the state
a better price than that at which the property would be assessed in
a condemnation proceeding. The major advantages of voluntary
purchase over eminent domain, however, are expediency, the sav-
ings in litigation costs, and goodwill. It is also possible that the
state will have more flexibility in identifying the interest to be pur-
chased and the use to which the property will be put."' However,
the funding process may impose on the state nearly as many stric-
tures as would the requirements of eminent domain.
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 345, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (citing Colberg for the proposition
that the state servitude is subordinate to federal rights); Bott v. Commission of Natural
Resources, 415 Mich. 45, -, 327 N.W.2d 838, 858 (1982) (citing Colberg as saying that a
state may set its own tests for navigability so long as they do not conflict with federal con-
trol); Sibson v. State, 110 N.H. 8, -, 259 A.2d 397, 400 (1969) (citing Colberg as holding
that the state servitude involves the "power to control, regulate, and utilize" public waters);
St. Lawrence Shores, Inc. v. State, 60 Misc. 2d 74, -, 302 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1969) (referring to Colberg for the proposition that damages do not lie for impaired access
under a bridge, but finding, in this case, that access was not impaired).
108. 516 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1973).
109. Id. at 1197.
110. Owens, supra note 28, at 640.
111. See infra notes 118-52 and accompanying text.
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While relatively uncommon," 2 donations are clearly a very desir-
able means of acquiring property. Aside from the obvious benefit
to the state, there are "[s]ubstantial income tax advantages" 1 3 to
the donee, and it has been urged that a donation program be incor-
porated into any coastal management plan." 4 Although careful
planning may avert some of the difficulties inherent in establishing
such a program, the risk remains that the state will not have com-
pletely free choice in what it acquires by donation, particularly
where the gift is testamentary. Furthermore, the donor may im-
pose unworkable or unacceptable conditions on his gift, and there
is no guarantee that a court will sanction the conveyance without
the conditions.1 5
Dedication is a particularly useful and inexpensive means of ac-
quiring land for such purposes as public access and recreation.
This method, however, has one major drawback:
The dedication requirement is .. .triggered only by requests for
approval of development proposals, and its use generally is limited
to instances of active property development. Because the dedication
requirement generally must relate back to public service needs or
costs being generated by the development, this method has only lim-
ited usefulness. It will not address needs in previously developed ar-
eas, and is of little use when the purpose of acquiring the land is to
prevent development." 6
A related problem is that, where the dedicated land is not inte-
grally connected with needs generated by a development, the dedi-
cation may be held void as illegal contract zoning.1 '
112. Owens, supra note 28, at 640-41.
113. Id. at 641.
114. Id. The commentator cautions, however, that success "demands extreme flexibility,
patience, diplomacy, initiative, and persistence by the acquiring agency." Id.
115. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (upholding a state court decision that
a testamentary trust establishing a racially segregated city park failed for lack of legitimate
purpose and that the property reverted to the devisor's heirs, despite the argument that the
trust should be amended under the cy pres doctrine to allow an integrated park).
116. Owens, supra note 28, at 641.
117. "In several . . . jurisdictions votes to rezone on the express condition that the owner
impose restrictions (sometimes called 'contract zoning') have been held invalid." Sylvania
Elec. Prods., Inc. v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, -, 183 N.E.2d 118, 121 (1962). The
rationale is that such private agreements represent an abdication of the legislative power.
See id. at -, 183 N.E.2d at 123-26 (Kirk, J., dissenting); D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 94;
see also Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785,
799-800, 553 P.2d 546, 556, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386, 395-96 (1976) (sacrifice sale of beach prop-
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Needless to say, the greatest difficulty with any of these acquisi-
tion methods is finding a willing grantor. If the landowner is open
to persuasion and negotiation, the state can acquire what it needs
with relatively little trouble. If the owner is unwilling to part with
his property, and if acquisition of the land is important, the state
must give serious consideration to condemnation proceedings.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Although the language of some inverse condemnation cases sug-
gests that the state is free to take private property at will so long
as it compensates the owner,"' this suggestion oversimplifies the
requirements for the exercise of eminent domain. The prime limi-
tation on the exercise of this power is found in the fifth amend-
ment, which states: "[N]or shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation."" Either by constitution or by
case law, all states have imposed similar limitations on eminent
domain. 20 Aside from the statutory procedural requirements,'2 '
three substantive limitations have evolved from the state and fed-
eral constitutional provisions:
1. The taking must be for a public use.
erty and dedication of public access held to give developer no right to proceed with a sepa-
rate subdivision because "the agreement would be invalid and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy." Id. at 800, 553 P.2d at 556, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 396). Cf. Frisco Land and
Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 753, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830 (1978) (upholding
requirement of beach access dedication as prerequisite to obtaining development permit be-
cause "a regulatory body may require dedication of property in the interests of the general
welfare as a condition of permitting the subdivision of lands."); see also Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395, 407
(1982), in which the court held:
A regulatory body may constitutionally require a dedication of property in the inter-
ests of the general welfare as a condition of permitting land development. It does not
act in eminent domain when it does this, and the validity of the dedication require-
ment is not dependent on a factual showing that the development has created the
need for it.
Apparently, even within a single state, the line between legitimate dedication and illegal
contract zoning is not particularly well defined.
118. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("When ...
[diminution of value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be
an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."); Liberty v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247, 254 (1981) ("An arbitrarily
conceived exaction will be nullified as a disguised attempt to take private property for pub-
lic use without resort to eminent domain . . .
119. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
120. D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 173 & n.5.
121. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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2. The state can take no greater interest than is reasonably nec-
essary to serve its purpose.
3. The owner must receive fair value for what is taken.
This section will examine the first two requirements. 122
A. Public Use
The "public use" requirement is the subject of varying interpre-
tations. Some jurisdictions have read the term to mean a use which
involves "a public purpose, benefit or the public welfare"'123 even
though a private individual may also derive considerable benefit. 24
Other courts have adhered strictly to the requirement of an actual,
overriding public use,125 including a "guarantee that the public will
122. This article will touch only briefly on valuation. Just compensation and its ramifica-
tions have provided enough material for several volumes. Among the works on the subject
are these: L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1953) (two
volumes); 4, 4A, & 5 J. SACKMAN, supra note 87; VALUATION FOR EMINENT DOMAIN (E. Rams
ed. 1973).
123. Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, -, 247 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1978).
124. A very recent United States Supreme Court decision, Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
81 L. Ed.2d 186 (1984), gives vigorous support to this point of view. The case upheld the
constitutionality of Hawaii's land reform program which, in effect, requires the conversion
of many small leaseholds into freehold estates, in a monumental effort to defeat the concen-
tration of most Hawaiian landownership in the hands of fewer than one hundred landlords.
The Court declared:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in
the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only
a private purpose. The Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that con-
demned property be put into use for the general public .... In such cases, govern-
ment does not itself have to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the tak-
ing's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
Clause [of the fifth amendment].
Id. at 199. See also D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 174 (discussing urban renewal projects
which are considered to meet the public use test although involving transfers of property
from one private owner to another), § 175 (discussing condemnation by private parties, such
as public service corporations). Hagman mentions as one instance of such "private condem-
nation," the "reclamation of wetlands." Id. § 175. See also Note, Coal Slurry Pipeline, 17 U.
RICH. L. REv. 789, 798-804 (1983) (discussing the availability of eminent domain authority
for construction of a coal slurry pipeline in Virginia).
125. See Karesh, 271 S.C. at -_, 247 S.E.2d at 344 (denying use of eminent domain to
condemn land for a parking garage and convention center on grounds that "the proposed
plan would allow the City to join hands with a developer and undertake a project primarily
of benefit to the developer, with no assurance of more than negligible advantage to the
general public."). See also the definition of public use found in a Virginia case:
A use to the public must be fixed and definite. It must be one in which the public, as
such, has an interest, and the terms and manner of its enjoyment must be within the
control of the State, independent of the rights of the private owner of the property
appropriated to the use. The use of the property cannot be said to be public if it can
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enjoy the use of the facilities '  or "an enforceable right [of thepublic] to a definite and fixed use of the property.' 1 27
Where the state retains both ownership and use of the property,
as in wildlife preserves, public parks and recreation areas, and
flood control projects, the public use requirement should be satis-
fied in any jurisdiction. Clearly, a more difficult situation arises
when the plan contemplates a cooperative venture by both govern-
ment and the private sector, such as restoration of a blighted wa-
terfront. 128 In such a situation, the public use and benefit ought
clearly to outweigh any private commercial advantage in order to
justify use of eminent domain. In any case, the condemning agency
would be well advised to articulate the public use for which the
property is to be taken, because such a statement will be given
considerable judicial deference if the condemnation is
challenged.
129
Closely related to the public use requirement is the requirement
of public necessity. The questions the public necessity test poses
are, first, "Is the use necessary?"; second, "Is eminent domain nec-
essary to achieve the use?"; and finally, "Is the quantum taken [of
either the acreage or the property interest] necessary to achieve
the use?"1 30
Where the public use is to be immediate and where the property
taken is to be used directly for that purpose, there should be little
difficulty in demonstrating necessity. In general, "the need for
making a given public improvement, for adopting a particular plan
for it, and for taking particular property are considered matters for
the discretion of the legislature or its appointed administrative
be gainsaid, denied, or withdrawn by the owner. The public use must dominate the
private gain.
Boyd v. C.C. Ritter Lumber Co., 119 Va. 348, 370, 89 S.E. 273, 279 (1916).
126. Karesh, 271 S.C. at -, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
127. Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 551, 134 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1964).
128. For an examination of other legal pitfalls in such a public-private restoration project,
see Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 15 Cal. 3d 577,
542 P.2d 645, 125 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1975).
129. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 176 ("A legislative declaration of public use bears a
strong presumption of validity."); see also Note, supra note 35, at 28 ("The test [of public
necessity] can be met ... by a legislative act declaring necessity ... ."). This point of view
was strongly affirmed in Hawaii Hous. Auth.: "Judicial deference is required because, in our
system of government, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be
advanced by an exercise of the taking power." 81 L. Ed. 2d at 200.
130. The third question, of the quantum condemned, is sufficiently distinct to be ac-
corded separate treatment. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
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body."' 131 Such a determination can be overturned only for "fraud,
bad faith, or abuse of discretion,"'132 all difficult grounds to
establish.
The necessity may be somewhat more difficult to demonstrate
where the state takes more property or a greater interest than is
strictly needed or where it takes property for some future use.
Such situations may arise when, for example, the "severance dam-
ages" due for injury to the adjoining uncondemned property ap-
proximate or exceed the cost of acquiring the entire parcel and the
state opts instead to condemn the damaged property. This type of
"excess condemnation" is almost certainly permissible, 33 although
it seems unlikely that wholesale condemnation which is not clearly
related to an identifiable public use would be sanctioned.
Again, in the wetlands context, the state may practice "future
condemnation" by acquiring stretches of coastline with the inten-
tion of merely holding them while a long-range coastal plan is for-
mulated. The state may, of course, argue that preservation is itself
a public use. However, so long as the amount of property taken
and the length of time it is to be held are reasonable, the court
should permit such future condemnation as within the state's dis-
cretion to plan ahead.'
A somewhat unusual question of the necessity of eminent do-
main arose in the Oregon case of State v. Hilderbrand.135 In that
case, the owner of property covered by the Scenic Waterways
Act "'36 repeatedly requested and was repeatedly denied permission
to build a cabin on the land. After the owner had made at least
four attempts to get approval, 1' the state Department of Trans-
portation, which administers the Scenic Waterways Act, filed a
condemnation suit on the grounds that the act "authorizes the
condemnation of 'related adjacent land' where the owner has pro-
posed using the land in a manner which would impair the natural
beauty of this scenic waterway and he has not subsequently aban-
131. D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 176.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 177.
134. See Carlor Co. v. City of Miami, 62 So. 2d 897, 902-03 (Fla. 1953) (failure to start
project for seven years held not to show bad faith).
135. 35 Or. App. 403, 582 P.2d 13 (1978).
136. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 390.805-390.925 (Repl. Part 1981).
137. 35 Or. App. at -, 582 P-2d at 14-15. It is not clear from the opinion whether the
landowner tried four or seven times to get his cabin approved. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 15.
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doned his plan notwithstanding the state's disapproval thereof."' 138
The court found the taking to be both necessary 39 and constitu-
tional, 40 given the peculiarities of the Scenic Waterways Act,
which would have allowed the landowner to proceed with his con-
struction one year after notifying the Department of Transporta-
tion. 14 The court held:
Thus, in light of the purpose of the Scenic Waterways Act, and giv-
ing due deference to the legislature's determination that public own-
ership of the related adjacent land is warranted under such circum-
stances, rather than having to maintain constant surveillance of it,
the condemnation provisions of ... [the Act] meet the test of rea-
sonable necessity and, therefore, are constitutional.142
Thus, the mere possibility of a detrimental use by the landowner
was sufficient to make a showing of both public necessity and of
the necessity of eminent domain. Although the decision in Hilder-
brand is closely tied to the precise wording of the statute, by anal-
ogy it could provide a valuable rationale for shoreland preservation
or for condemnation of otherwise permitted development rights.143
B. The Quantum of Interest Taken
It is hornbook law that the state can acquire only the property
interest which is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose
for which the condemnation action was brought. 4 4 The rationale
behind this rule has been expressed thus: "If an easement will sat-
isfy the public needs, to take the fee would be unjust to the owner,
who is entitled to retain whatever the public needs do not require,
and to the public, which should not be obliged to pay for more
than it needs.' 45 Furthermore, by taking the entire fee, the con-
demning agency has removed the property from the tax base;
whereas, if only an easement is condemned, the owner can be taxed
138. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 15 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 390.845(6)(a) (Repl. Part 1981)).
139. 35 Or. App. at -, 582 P.2d at 15-16.
140. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 16.
141. OR. REV. STAT. § 390.845(3) & (4) (Repl. Part 1981).
142. 35 Or. App. at -, 582 P.2d at 16-17.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
144. 3 J. SACKMAN, supra note 87, § 9.2. See also Barclay v. Howell, 31 U.S. (6 Peters)
498, 513 (1832).
145. 3 J. SACKMAN, supra note 87, § 9.2[2].
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on the underlying fee.14 6
However, it appears that this rule is often more honored in the
breach than in the observance. Judicial deference to the legislative
determination of public necessity may uphold the taking of a fee
for even a temporary necessity. 147 Furthermore, there are often
valid reasons for acquiring a fee even when a lesser interest might
suffice: "a need to acquire all property rights to adequately protect
the property; the lack of any significant cost savings with alterna-
tives; simplicity for both the private landowners and the govern-
ment; and a lack of familiarity with less than fee acquisition.' ' 4
One clear case in which taking the entire fee would be justified is
that of a conservation easement so extensive that the burdened
land would be nearly valueless to its owner. (The resemblance to a
taking by regulation is obvious.) If the state's purpose is resource
preservation, nothing less than fee acquisition may suffice.
On the other hand, in many instances, taking a lesser interest
may result in both savings to the state (in acquisition and some-
times in management costs) and retention of substantial benefits
by the landowner. Usually, this lesser interest will be some form of
easement, although there seems to be no reason why a leasehold or
even an intangible interest, such as a franchise, 49 could not be
taken in appropriate circumstances.
A beach access easement through private upland property would
give the public a right of passage and allow the owner to use the
remaining land in any way which did not interfere with the ease-
ment. Conversely, a conservation or scenic easement might be
taken to prevent commercial development while leaving the land-
owner certain agricultural or recreational uses. 50 A variation on
146. See Owens, supra note 28, at 639 & n.58.
147. See Wright v. Dade County, 216 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert.
denied, 225 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008 (1970) (condemnor entitled to
fee even though use "would not continue for a substantial period .... "); see also D.
HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 177 (citing instances in which "excess condemnation" has been
upheld).
148. Owens, supra note 28, at 637. Owens' analysis applies to all types of land acquisition;
his last reason for acquiring a fee (ignorance of other interests) is less applicable to condem-
nation than to negotiated purchase.
149. For a discussion of the case law and commentary on the condemnation of intangible
property, see City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 66-69, 646 P.2d 835, 839-40,
183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 677-79 (1982). The decision held that the plaintiff city had the right to
condemn a professional football franchise but remanded the case for evidence of public use.
150. See, e.g., Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966); Owens, supra
note 28, at 637-38.
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the conservation easement is the acquisition of development rights,
whereby the landowner relinquishes his right to develop his prop-
erty.151 Again, in considering any of these interests, the acquiring
agency should balance the cost of the entire fee against the cost of
the easement (less any tax revenues on the underlying fee from
which the agency would otherwise receive a benefit).
While such easements can often be of benefit to the state, there
are disadvantages as well. One commentator points to the difficul-
ties of precisely identifying and valuing the interest and to the pos-
sibility in some cases of "significant long-term administrative and
enforcement costs not incurred with fee acquisitions.' 15 2 All of
these factors must be weighed in determining the quantum of in-
terest to be taken, but there is no particular reason to believe that
the costs would be greater than those of administering many
coastal zone management plans.
IV. PROBLEMS DURING THE CONDEMNATION PROCESS
Having determined that only eminent domain will meet its
needs, the state still faces the protracted legal process of condem-
nation. The procedure will probably involve a showing of use and
necessity, 153 notice to the landowner,5 4 and some sort of judicial
determination of just compensation. 55 Some jurisdictions may
even require a showing that a good-faith effort to purchase has
been made prior to initiating the condemnation procedure. 56
151. See D. HAGMAN, supra note 27, § 182; Owens, supra note 28, at 637-38; see also
Schoenbaum & Rosenberg, The Legal Implementation of Coastal Zone Management: The
North Carolina Model, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1, 33-34 (discussing transferable development rights
(TDR's) in the coastal zone). TDR's allow the owner of property whose development is re-
stricted by environmental or preservationist legislation to transfer those development rights
to unprotected property. The validity of TDR's was examined in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), in which the Court found that these rights mitigated
the burden imposed by New York's Landmark Preservation Law. Id. at 137. But see Fred F.
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5
(1976) (holding that TDR's could not prevent the conversion of private property into public
parks from being a taking).
152. Owens, supra note 28, at 639 & n.59.
153. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1240.030, 1240.040 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
73.021(1) (West Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.7(b)(2), (3) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
154. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.031 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.9
(Repl. Vol. 1980).
155. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.071 (West Cur. Supp. 1983) (jury trial to determine
compensation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.19 to -46.23 (Repl. Vol. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983)
(commission to determine compensation).
156. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 213.55 (Cum. Supp. 1983-84); VA. CODE ANN. §
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Aside from the purely procedural entanglements that may arise,
the potential exists for harassment by either party during pen-
dency of the litigation. Because title generally does not pass to the
condemnor until after the proceedings,'57 a landowner may be able,
in the interim, to cause the very harm which the condemnation
was intended to prevent. Although such an action may reduce the
amount of compensation which the owner ultimately receives, irre-
mediable damage may have been done. Furthermore, the owner
may not be especially concerned about his condemnation award if
the value of the property to him is the right to carry on the activ-
ity in question. (An example is the removal of fill from a wetland.
The owner may want only to remove as much fill as possible before
title passes.) Neither is there any particular certainty that a pre-
liminary injunction will lie to prevent the harmful activity. 8
On the other hand, certain practices by the condemning agency
are also susceptible to characterization (and litigation) as harass-
ment. One such practice is "condemnation blight," by which "an
announcement that an undesignated parcel or parcels of land may
be appropriated at some future time for a generally unappealing
project may tend to decrease land values in the vicinity.' 59 Simi-
larly, the agency's announced intention to institute eminent do-
main proceedings against specific property at some future date
may result in impaired value (and hence reduced compensation). 60
25-46.5 (Repl. Vol. 1980) ("No proceedings shall be taken to condemn property until a bona
fide but ineffectual effort has been made to acquire from the owner by purchase the prop-
erty sought to be condemned ...."). But cf. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1230.030 (West 1982)
("Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase or other means
or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized to acquire
the property.").
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.111 (West Cum. Supp. 1983); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-
46.24 (Repl. Vol. 1980) (both statutes vesting title upon payment of judicially determined
compensation). Some states provide a "quick-taking" procedure whereby a defeasible title
vests in the condemning body prior to litigation. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.57
(Cum. Supp. 1983). However, such procedures may be available only in specific situations.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 74.011-74.121 (West Cum. Supp. 1984) (procedure limited to
actions by Department of Transportation, school boards, flood control districts, and certain
other authorities and public utilities); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33.1-119 to -130 (Repl. Vol. 1976 &
Cum. Supp. 1983) (procedure limited to actions by State Highway Commissioner).
158. See, e.g., Florida E. Coast Ry. v. City of Miami, 299 So. 2d 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (holding that condemnee had vested right to continue fill operation begun under fed-
eral permit).
159. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 45, 500 P.2d 1345, 1350, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1,
6 (1972).
160. Id. at 51, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11:
[A] condemnee must be provided with an opportunity to demonstrate that (1) the
public authority acted improperly either by unreasonably delaying eminent domain
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Another variety of government oppression, with elements of
both condemnation blight and taking by regulation, was examined
in Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States. 6' In that case a devel-
oper acquired land for a subdivision in an area subsequently desig-
nated as a National Seashore. 162 Local approvals for the develop-
ment were successfully opposed by the National Park Service.'6
The government also acquired nearly all of the surrounding prop-
erty by one means or another 6 4 but declined to purchase the
plaintiff's land. 65 As the court observed:
Thus plaintiff remains without a market for its land. The private
sector is not interested, understandably, because of the well publi-
cized threat of eventual condemnation of [Point Reyes National]
Seashore realty. The public sector, namely the National Park Ser-
vice, is not interested because after having successfully thwarted
plaintiff's subdivision plans, it realizes that plaintiff is a party who
can be deferred interminably, and dealt with at pleasure. 166
The court found a taking here of the entire fee. 67
The Drakes Bay case is, of course, an extreme example of op-
pressive conduct by a condemnor. It is possible that less drastic
actions might withstand judicial scrutiny, but the time and ex-
pense of litigating such collateral issues should make the condemn-
ing agency consider the negative implications of the course it in-
tends to pursue in acquiring the property.
V. MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Public landownership is not a process that stops with acquisi-
tion. It is instead a daily succession of maintenance and manage-
ment policy decisions. Although the primary public use will have
been determined before condemnation, effectuating that use will
require a number of other determinations.
action following an announcement of intent to condemn or by other unreasonable
conduct prior to condemnation; and (2) as a result of such action the property in
question suffered a diminution in market value.
161. 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. C1. 1970).
162. Id. at 575.
163. Id. at 576-81.
164. Id. at 586.
165. Id. at 585.
166. Id. at 586.
167. Id. at 586, 588.
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For example, if the purpose is preservation, should the state sim-
ply stand by while nature takes its course, even if the natural evo-
lutionary process means destruction of rare biological species or
particularly valuable topographical features, such as the dunes
forming the barrier islands of the Atlantic Coast? 6" On the other
hand, does the state have the resources (in money, manpower, and
expertise) to undertake an active wildlife management program?
Such a program may involve population controls for certain spe-
cies,16 9 protection for certain others,170 periodic burning or timber-
ing,171 and maintenance of the quality and quantity of water in the
wetlands. 72 When even the federal budget is severely strained by
such undertakings in the national wildlife refuges, s it seems un-
likely that many coastal states are affluent enough to take on simi-
lar programs on anything but a very small scale.
Another related decision is whether, and to what extent, to per-
mit uses besides the primary use. For example, should the state
allow any sort of recreational activity in an area set aside for pres-
ervation? 174 Similarly, should the harvesting of natural resources,
such as oysters or wild rice, be permitted? Are any of these or
other uses compatible with the primary purposes for which the
land was taken?
Again, economics may be the decisive factor. Among the major
demands made on a skeleton staff at the Chincoteague national
refuge in Virginia are "recreation-related work-garbage collection,
trail building and maintenance, painting, traffic control, beach pa-
trol, and various visitor services. '"7 5 Similar activities may be re-
quired even if the state holds only a beach access easement
168. To some extent, a "hands-off" policy seems to be contemplated by the federal
Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (1982), which limits the availability
of federal funds for coastal barrier development. (However, the federal government is not
the landowner.)
[I]t is the purpose of this Act to minimize the loss of human life, wasteful expendi-
ture of Federal revenues, and the damage to fish, wildlife, and other natural resources
associated with the coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts by restricting
future Federal expenditures and financial assistance which have the effect of encour-
aging development of coastal barriers ....
Id. § 3501(b).
169. Doherty, Refuges on the Rocks, AUDUBON, July 1983, at 74, 79, 86.
170. Id. at 77, 78.
171. Id. at 84-85.
172. Id. at 76, 79.
173. Id., passim.
174. See Owens, supra note 28, at 661.
175. Doherty, supra note 169, at 86.
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through private uplands.
Another consideration has been described as "[a] philosophical
uneasiness with government having anything other than a very
limited role in landownership. ' 17 6 In other words, is the state the
best manager? The federal government has recently begun to
reevaluate its fitness to cope with its extensive holdings and has,
although with little success, 7 attempted to divest itself of some of
its property. According'to a magazine article, one former Secretary
of the Interior considers the government "an inept landlord; it
neither manages property well nor puts it to its best use.117 8 Al-
though such pronouncements may reflect a political ideology
rather than a land-use philosophy, they are to some extent a valid
consideration when a state is deciding whether to exercise its
power to acquire land.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, coastal development planning has been viewed pri-
marily as a regulatory process in which the only parties are the
developer and the governmental body. Litigation has focused
mainly on whether a permit denial can withstand fifth amendment
scrutiny.17 9
Because of its drastic nature (including the threat to private
property ownership 80), eminent domain has seldom been used as
an alternative. Although the cost of land acquisition prevents emi-
nent domain from being an all-purpose substitute for planning and
regulatory programs, it can at times be a valuable device for allo-
cating sensitive and scarce resources. It has been suggested that, in
the long run, public ownership may be "the most effective tech-
nique of countering . . . unplanned chaos."'
176. Owens, supra note 28, at 635-36.
177. See Public Lands and Land Use Committee, 16 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 183, 192-93
(1983).
178. Land Sale of the Century, TIMiE, Aug. 23, 1982, at 16, 16 (discussing James Watts'
policies). See also G. LIBECAP, LOCKING UP THE RANGE: FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND GRAz-
ING 99-102 (1981). Similar claims of mismanagement may be made concerning the states'
control of publicly owned bay bottoms. See Oetgen & Sauder, Rival Forces Argue as Bay's
Plight Worsens, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 4, 1984, at A-1, col. 4.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28 and 34-61.
180. See supra text accompanying note 33.
181. Comment, Public Land Ownership, 52 YALE L.J. 634, 636 (1943). See also Owens,
supra note 28, at 636 ("Preserving these [wetlands and coastal] areas through acquisition is
often more equitable and effective, legally and politically, than attempting to curtail devel-
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Government should also consider the middle ground of acquiring
development rights or scenic easements. 82 Acquisition of less-
than-fee ownership enables the state to control only the interest it
needs and "may provide amicable accommodations where fee ac-
quisition would lead to bitter conflict.'
83
In advocating increased use of eminent domain to acquire either
fee interests or development rights, the authors do not disregard
the often-poor record of governmental land management' 4 or the
costs of administration and management.'8 5 However, these consid-
erations must be balanced against the public interest in preserving
critical resources for the future and against the labyrinthine ineffi-
ciency of present regulatory programs.8 6 Despite the difficulty of
assigning values to such non-monetary factors, the balance will
often come down in favor of public ownership.
When regulatory schemes fail, the government should exercise
its power to preserve irreplaceable coastal resources by diversion of
tax dollars into land acquisition programs.8 7 Failure to do so may,
in fact, amount to an abdication of stewardship: "The land belongs
to the people . . . a little of it to those dead . . . some to those
living . . . but most of it belongs to those yet to be born . "188
opment through regulation.").
182. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
183. Owens, supra note 28, at 639.
184. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 168-75.
186. See supra notes 4-20 and accompanying text.
187. Some coastal states are apparently beginning to use land acquisition as a means of
resource preservation. For example, Florida's Save Our Coasts program recently acquired all
the remaining privately owned property on an island, Bahia Honda Key, from a developer
who had operated a "clothing-optional" beach and had intended to build condominiums on
the site. No Nudes, Good News for Park, Miami Herald, Mar. 17, 1984, at IB, col. 5. For an
excellent survey of sources of funding for land acquisition programs, see Owens, supra note
28, at 641-45.
188. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, -, 201 N.W.2d 761, 771 n.6 (1972) (quoting
Jackson County Zoning and Sanitation Dep't letterhead).
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